We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under the assumption that the goods form an undirected graph and each agent must receive a connected subgraph. Our focus is on well-studied fairness notions including envy-freeness and maximin share fairness. We establish graph-specific maximin share guarantees, which are tight for large classes of graphs in the case of two agents and for paths and stars in the general case. Unlike in previous work, our guarantees are with respect to the complete-graph maximin share, which allows us to compare possible guarantees for different graphs. For instance, we show that for biconnected graphs it is possible to obtain at least 3/4 of the maximin share, while for the remaining graphs the guarantee is at most 1/2. In addition, we determine the optimal relaxation of envy-freeness that can be obtained with each graph for two agents, and characterize the set of trees and complete bipartite graphs that always admit an allocation satisfying envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) for three agents. Our work demonstrates several applications of graph-theoretical tools and concepts to fair division problems.
Introduction
We consider a classical resource allocation setting where a set of goods are to be allocated among interested agents. Our goal is to find an allocation that is fair to all agents. This problem has been addressed in a large body of literature on fair division [Brams and Taylor, 1996a; Moulin, 2003 ], which has found applications ranging from divorce settlement [Brams and Taylor, 1996b ] to credit assignment [de Clippel et al., 2008] . The two most prominent fairness notions in the literature are envy-freeness and proportionality. An allocation is said to be envy-free if every agent likes her bundle at least as much as any other agent's bundle, and proportional if every agent receives value at least 1/n of her value for the entire set of goods, where n denotes the number of agents.
Our focus in this paper is on the setting where we allocate indivisible goods. This pertains to the allocation of houses, cars, artworks, electronics, and many other common items. When goods are indivisible, neither envy-freeness nor proportionality can always be fulfilled. 1 As a result, relaxations of both notions have been studied. Envy-freeness is often relaxed to envy-freeness up to one good (EF1)-this means that any envy that an agent has towards another agent can be eliminated by removing a good from the latter agent's bundle. An EF1 allocation exists for any number of agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations [Lipton et al., 2004] . Likewise, proportionality can be relaxed to maximin share fairness-the maximin share (MMS) of an agent is the largest value that an agent can guarantee for herself if she is allowed to divide the goods into n parts and always receives the worst part. An allocation that gives every agent her maximin sharesaid to satisfy maximin share fairness-does not always exist for additive valuations, but a constant multiplicative approximation can be obtained [Kurokawa et al., 2018] .
Perhaps the most well-known fair division protocol is the cut-and-choose protocol, which can be used to allocate a divisible good between two agents. In this protocol, the first agent divides the good into two equal parts (this is possible because the good is divisible), and the second agent chooses the part that she prefers. The cut-and-choose protocol has a direct analogue in the indivisible goods setting: since an equal partition may no longer exist, the first agent now divides the goods into two parts that are as equal as possible in her view. The resulting allocation is guaranteed to satisfy both maximin share fairness and EF1. 2 However, these guarantees rely crucially on the assumption that any allocation of the goods to the two agents can be chosen-in reality, there are often constraints on the allocations that we desire. One common type of constraints is captured by a model of Bouveret et al. [2017] , where the goods are vertices of a connected undirected graph and each agent must be allocated a connected subgraph. For instance, the goods could represent offices in a university building that we wish to divide between research groups, and it is desirable for each group to receive a connected set of offices in order to facilitate communication within the group. To what extent do the fairness guarantees continue to hold when connectivity constraints are imposed, and how does the answer depend on the underlying graph?
Our Contributions
In this paper, we make several contributions to the active line of work on fairly allocating indivisible goods under connectivity constraints. 3 While we also provide fairness guarantees for any number of agents, the majority of our results concern the setting of two agents. We emphasize here that this setting is fundamental in fair division. Indeed, a number of fair division applications including divorce settlements, inheritance division, 1 Consider two agents trying to divide a single valuable good. 2 In fact, it also satisfies a stronger relaxation of envy-freeness called envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018] . 3 We survey this line of work in Section 1.2. and international border disputes often fall into this setting, and numerous prominent works in the field deal exclusively with the two-agent case (e.g., [Brams and Fishburn, 2000; Brams et al., 2012 Brams et al., , 2014 Kilgour and Vetschera, 2018] ). 4 First, in Section 3 we study maximin share fairness for agents with additive valuations. We define the price of connectivity (PoC) of a graph to be the largest gap between the graph maximin share (G-MMS), which is defined over all partitions that respect the connectivity constraints of the graph, and the maximin share defined over all possible partitions (in other words, the maximin share defined over the complete graph). We show that in the case of two agents, this quantity precisely captures the MMS approximation that can be guaranteed. In other words, if a graph has a PoC of α for two agents, then there always exists an allocation that gives both agents α times their MMS, and the factor α is tight. The same is true for any number of agents provided that the graph is a tree.
With this equivalence in hand, we proceed to determine the PoC for various graphs. In the two-agent case, we show that the PoC is related to the vertex connectivity of the graph, i.e., the minimum number of vertices whose deletion disconnects the graph. For graphs with connectivity exactly 1, including all trees, we show that the PoC is 1/k where k is the maximum number of connected components that result from deleting one vertex. As a consequence, the PoC is at most 1/2 for any graph in this class. On the other hand, we show a lower bound of 3/4 for all graphs with connectivity at least 2this bound is tight for all graphs with connectivity exactly 2 and, perhaps surprisingly, for certain graphs with connectivity up to 5.
For any number of agents, we establish a general lower bound of 1/(m − n + 1) for the PoC, where m and n denote the number of goods and agents, respectively; this implies the existence of a connected allocation with regard to any graph that gives every agent at least 1/(m − n + 1) of their MMS. We also derive the exact PoC for paths and stars. Notably, in order to establish the PoC for paths, we introduce a new relaxation of proportionality that we call the indivisible proportional share (IPS) property. This notion strengthens a number of relaxations of proportionality in the literature while maintaining guaranteed existence, and may therefore be of independent interest.
Next, in Section 4 we turn our attention to envy-freeness relaxations and allow agents to have arbitrary monotonic valuations. In the case of two agents, Bilò et al. [2019] characterized the graphs for which an EF1 allocation always exists as the graphs that admit a "bipolar ordering" (defined in Section 2). While the characterization yields a strong fairness guarantee for this class of graphs, it does not give any guarantee for the remaining graphs. We generalize this result by providing the optimal relaxation of envy-freeness for every graph-specifically, for each graph, we determine the smallest k for which an allocation that is envy-free up to k goods (EFk) always exists with two agents. As a corollary, we show that an EF(m − 2) allocation exists for any connected graph, and the bound m − 2 is tight for stars. By contrast, we show that the fairness notion envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), which is stronger than EF1, can only be guaranteed for complete graphs with two agents. We then address the case of three agents, where we characterize the set of trees and complete bipartite graphs that admit an EF1 allocation for arbitrary valuations.
From a technical point of view, our work makes extensive use of tools and concepts from graph theory, including vertex connectivity, linkedness, ear decomposition, bipolar ordering, and block decomposition. While bipolar ordering and block decomposition have been used by Bilò et al. [2019] in the EF1 characterization that we mentioned, the other concepts have not previously appeared in the fair division literature to the best of our knowledge. We believe that establishing these connections enriches the growing literature and lays the groundwork for fruitful collaborations between researchers across the two well-established fields.
Finally, we remark that with the exception of Theorem 3.11, all of our guarantees are constructive. In particular, we exhibit polynomial-time algorithms that produce allocations satisfying the guarantees.
Related Work
Fair allocation of indivisible goods has received considerable attention from the research community, especially in the last few years. We refer to surveys by Thomson [2016] , Markakis [2017] , and Moulin [2019] for an overview of recent developments in the area.
The papers most closely related to ours are the two papers that we mentioned, by Bouveret et al. [2017] and Bilò et al. [2019] . Bouveret et al. showed that for any number of agents with additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that gives every agent her maximin share when the graph is a tree, but not necessarily when the graph is a cycle. It is important to note that their maximin share notion corresponds to our G-MMS notion and is defined based on the graph, with only connected allocations with respect to that graph taken into account in an agent's calculation. As an example of a consequence, even though a cycle permits strictly more connected allocations than a path, it offers less guarantee in terms of the G-MMS. Our approach of considering the (complete-graph) MMS allows us to directly compare the guarantees that can be obtained for different graphs. Bilò et al. [2019] investigated the same model with respect to relaxations of envyfreeness. As we mentioned, they characterized the set of graphs for which EF1 can be guaranteed in the case of two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations. Moreover, they showed that an EF1 allocation always exists on a path for n ≤ 4. Intriguingly, the existence question for n ≥ 5 remains open, although they showed that an EF2 allocation can be guaranteed for any n.
Besides Bouveret et al. [2017] and Bilò et al. [2019] , a number of other authors have recently studied fairness under connectivity constraints. Lonc and Truszczynski [2018] investigated maximin share fairness in the case of cycles, also concentrating on the G-MMS notion, while Suksompong [2019] focused on paths and provided approximations of envy-freeness, proportionality, as well as another fairness notion called equitability. considered fairness in conjunction with the economic efficiency notion of Pareto optimality. Bouveret et al. [2019] studied the problem of chore division, where all items yield disutility to the agents, and gave complexity results on deciding the existence of envy-free, proportional, and equitable allocations for paths and stars.
Considering connected allocations can also be useful in settings where we are not interested in connectedness per se, or perhaps the goods do not even lie on any graph. A technique that has received interest recently is to arrange the goods on a path and compute a connected allocation with respect to the path. Variants of this technique have been used to devise algorithms that find a fair allocation using few queries [Oh et al., 2019] or divide goods fairly among groups of agents [Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2018; Kyropoulou et al., 2019] .
A related line of work also combines graphs with resource allocation, but uses graphs to capture the connection between agents instead of goods. In particular, a graph specifies the acquaintance relationship among agents. Abebe et al. [2017] and Bei et al. [2017] defined graph-based versions of envy-freeness and proportionality with divisible resources where agents only evaluate their shares relative to other agents with whom they are acquainted. Beynier et al. [2018] and Bredereck et al. [2018] studied the graph-based version of envy-freeness with indivisible goods. Aziz et al. [2018] introduced a number of fairness notions parameterized by the acquaintance graph.
Besides graphs, other types of constraints that have been considered in the literature include cardinality constraints [Biswas and Barman, 2018] and matroid constraints [Gourvès and Monnot, 2019] .
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of agents, and M = {1, 2, . . . , m} the set of goods. There is a bijection between the goods in M and the m vertices of a connected undirected graph G; we will refer to goods and vertices interchangeably. A bundle is a subset of goods, and an allocation is a partition of M into n bundles (M 1 , . . . , M n ) such that agent i receives bundle M i . A bundle is called connected if the goods in it form a connected subgraph of G, and an allocation or a partition is connected if all of its bundles are connected. We assume in this paper that allocations are required to be connected.
Each agent i has a nonnegative valuation u i (M ′ ) for each bundle M ′ ⊆ M , where we assume without loss of generality that u i (∅) = 0 for all i. For a good g ∈ M , we will use u i ({g}) and u i (g) interchangeably. A valuation u is said to be monotonic if
and binary if it is additive and u(g) ∈ {0, 1} for all g ∈ M . An instance consists of the goods, their underlying graph, the agents, and their valuations for the goods.
We assume throughout the paper that valuations are monotonic, and in the context of maximin share fairness (Section 3) that they are additive. The additivity assumption is commonly made in the fair division literature, especially when studying maximin share fairness [Bouveret et al., 2017; Caragiannis et al., 2016; Dickerson et al., 2014; Kurokawa et al., 2018; Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018] .
We are ready to define the fairness notions that we consider in this paper, starting with maximin share fairness [Budish, 2011] .
Definition 2.1. Given a graph G, an additive valuation u, and the number of agents n, the graph maximin share (G-MMS) for G, u, n is defined as
where the maximum is taken over all partitions (M 1 , . . . , M n ) that are connected with respect to G. The maximin share (MMS) for u, n is defined as
where CG denotes the complete graph over the goods. When the parameters are clear from the context, we will refer to the graph maximin share and the maximin share simply as G-MMS and MMS, respectively. A partition for which the maximum is attained is called a G-MMS partition (resp., MMS partition).
It follows from the definition that
Next, we define the price of connectivity.
Definition 2.2. Given a graph G and the number of agents n, the price of connectivity (PoC) of G for n agents is defined as
where the infimum is taken over all possible additive valuations u. 5 We denote the PoC of a graph G for n agents by PoC(G, n).
When G and n are clear from the context, we will refer to PoC(G, n) simply as PoC. Note that the PoC is always at most 1, and is exactly 1 for complete graphs of any size. Moreover, the PoC is 1 if m ≤ n.
We now introduce relaxations of envy-freeness [Lipton et al., 2004; Caragiannis et al., 2016] .
Definition 2.3. An allocation (M 1 , . . . , M n ) satisfies
• envy-freeness up to k goods (EFk), for a given nonnegative integer k, if for any agents i, j, there exists a (possibly empty) bundle
• envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) if for any agents i, j and any good g ∈ M j , we have
An EF0 allocation is said to be envy-free. It follows immediately from the definition that envy-freeness implies EFX, which in turn implies EF1. If we allow incomplete allocations, achieving envy-freeness and all of its relaxations is trivial, for example by simply not allocating any good. Hence we will assume that all goods must be allocated when we discuss envy-freeness and its relaxations.
All graphs considered in this paper are assumed to be connected. The vertex connectivity (or simply connectivity) of a graph G is the minimum number of vertices whose deletion disconnects G. A graph with vertex connectivity at least k is said to be kconnected. By definition, every connected graph is 1-connected. A 2-connected graph is also called biconnected. A bipolar ordering (also called bipolar numbering) of a graph is an ordering of its vertices such that every prefix and every suffix of the ordering forms a connected graph.
Maximin Share Fairness
In this section, we consider the fairness guarantees in terms of maximin share fairness. We assume throughout the section that agents are endowed with additive valuations. We warm up by showing that for graphs and numbers of agents with the property that it is always possible to give every agent their G-MMS, the PoC is equal to the best possible MMS approximation.
Proposition 3.1. Let n be any positive integer, G be any graph, and α := PoC(G, n). Suppose that for n agents, there always exists a connected allocation that gives each agent at least their G-MMS. Then, for n agents, there always exists a connected allocation that gives each agent at least α times their MMS. Moreover, the factor α is tight.
Proof. Assume that n and G satisfy the hypotheses of the proposition. By assumption, for any n agents, there is a connected allocation that gives each agent at least their G-MMS. Since PoC(G, n) = α, the same allocation also gives each agent at least α times their MMS.
We now show that the factor α cannot be improved. Since PoC(G, n) = α, for any ǫ > 0 there exists a valuation u such that G-MMS(G, u, n) < (α + ǫ) · MMS(u, n).
Consider n agents, each with the valuation u. From the definition of G-MMS, any connected allocation gives some agent value at most G-MMS(G, u, n). Hence, in any connected allocation, some agent gets value less than (α+ǫ)·MMS(u, n). The conclusion follows.
Prior work has established the existence of a connected allocation that gives every agent their G-MMS if n = 2 [Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018, Cor. 2] or if G is a tree [Bouveret et al., 2017, Thm. 5.4] . Proposition 3.1 therefore yields the following:
Theorem 3.2. Let n be any positive integer, G be any graph, and α := PoC(G, n). If n = 2, or if G is a tree, then there always exists a connected allocation that gives each agent at least α times their MMS. Moreover, the factor α is tight in both cases.
The rest of this section is devoted to obtaining bounds on the PoC for arbitrary graphs in the case of two agents and for paths and stars in the general case. By Theorem 3.2, this is equivalent to finding the optimal MMS approximation for each of these cases.
Two Agents
We first focus on the case of two agents. We begin by establishing the PoC for all graphs with connectivity 1.
Theorem 3.3. Let G be a graph with connectivity exactly 1, and let k ≥ 2 be the maximum number of connected components that can result from deleting a single vertex of G. Then PoC(G, 2) = 1/k.
Proof. First, we show that the PoC of G is at most 1/k. Let v be a vertex of G whose deletion results in k components. Consider a valuation with value k for v, value 1 for an arbitrary vertex in each of the k components, and value 0 for all other vertices. The MMS is k. In any connected bipartition, the part that does not contain v is a subset of one of the k components, so this part has value at most 1. Hence the PoC is at most 1/k.
Next, we show that the PoC of G is at least 1/k. Take an arbitrary valuation u, and assume without loss of generality that u(M ) = 1. Since MMS(u, 2) ≤ u(M )/2 = 1/2, the desired claim follows if there is a connected bipartition such that both parts have value at least 1/(2k). Assume that no such bipartition exists.
Pick a spanning tree T of G, and let v be an arbitrary vertex. The removal of v results in a number of subtrees of T ; clearly, at most one of these subtrees can have value more than 1/2. If such a subtree exists, we move from v towards the adjacent vertex in that subtree and repeat the procedure with the new center vertex. Note that we will never traverse back an edge-otherwise there are two disjoint subtrees with value more than 1/2 each, contradicting u(M ) = 1. Since the tree is finite, we eventually reach a vertex v such that all subtrees T 1 , . . . , T r resulting from the removal of v have value at most 1/2 each.
Since T i and T \T i are both connected for every i, by our earlier assumption, each of the subtrees T 1 , . . . , T r has value less than 1/(2k). Recall that in the original graph G, removing v can result in at most k components. This means that if r > k, the r subtrees must be connected by some edges not belonging to T . If subtrees T i and T j are connected by such an edge, we can merge T i and T j into one component. Note that T i ∪ T j has value less than 1/(2k) + 1/(2k) = 1/k ≤ 1/2, so since T i ∪ T j and T \(T i ∪ T j ) are both connected, T i ∪ T j must again have value less than 1/(2k). Our procedure can be repeated until the components can no longer be merged, at which point we are left with at most k components. Each of these components has value less than 1/(2k), which implies that v has value more than 1 − k/(2k) = 1/2. In this case, a bipartition with v as one part is a MMS partition, so MMS(u, 2) = 1 − u(v). On the other hand, at least one of the (at most) k components has value at least (1 − u(v))/k, which is 1/k of the MMS. We can take a connected bipartition with such a component as one part and obtain the desired result.
If a graph admits a bipolar ordering, then since every prefix and every suffix is connected, removing any vertex can result in at most two connected components. For graphs with connectivity higher than 1 (i.e., removing any vertex keeps the graph connected), we show later (Theorem 3.7) that the PoC is at least 3/4. Hence we have:
Corollary 3.4. For n = 2, the PoC of a graph that admits a bipolar ordering is at least 1/2.
We remark that the proof of Theorem 3.3 also yields a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a bipartition such that both parts have value at least 1/k of the MMS. To compute an allocation between two agents such that both agents receive 1/k of their MMS, we simply let the first agent compute a desirable bipartition, and let the second agent choose the part that she prefers. Since MMS(u, 2) ≤ u(M )/2, the second agent is always satisfied.
Before we move on to results about graphs with higher connectivity, we show the following lemma, which will help simplify our subsequent proofs. The lemma implies that in order to prove a lower bound on the PoC in the case of two agents, it suffices to establish the bound for valuations such that in a MMS partition, the two parts are of equal value. over all valuations u, we only take the infimum over all valuations u such that in any MMS partition according to u, the two parts are of equal value.
Proof. Let u be an arbitrary valuation, and suppose that in a MMS partition, the two parts are of value x ≤ y. We have MMS(u, 2) = x. Let α := G-MMS(G,u,2) MMS (u,2) . In any connected bipartition, each part either has value at most αx, or at least (
Consider a modified valuation u ′ where in the MMS partition above, we arbitrarily decrease the values of some goods in the part with value y so that the part has value x. It is clear that MMS(u ′ , 2) = x. With respect to u ′ , in any connected bipartition, each part either has value at most αx, or at least y
Since the two parts in any MMS partition according to u ′ are of equal value, the proof is complete.
Next, we consider biconnected graphs, i.e., graphs with connectivity at least 2. We show that the PoC is at least 3/4 for all such graphs. For this result, we will use a property of biconnected graphs which we state in the following proposition. An open ear decomposition of a graph consists of a cycle as the first ear and a sequence of paths as subsequent ears such that in each path, the first and last vertices belong to previous ears while the remaining vertices do not.
Proposition 3.6 (Whitney [1932a,b] ). In a biconnected graph with at least three vertices, any two vertices belong to a common cycle, and there exists an open ear decomposition. Moreover, we may choose any cycle in the graph as the first ear. 6 Theorem 3.7. Let G be a biconnected graph. Then PoC(G, 2) ≥ 3/4.
Proof. The case m ≤ 2 is trivial, so consider m ≥ 3. Take an arbitrary valuation u, and assume without loss of generality that u(M ) = 1. By Lemma 3.5, we may also assume that MMS(u, 2) = 1/2. Call a good heavy if it has value more than 1/4. Since there can be at most one heavy good in each part of a MMS partition, there are at most two heavy goods in total. Call these heavy goods g 1 and g 2 ; if there are fewer than two heavy goods, pick the remaining good(s) arbitrarily. By Proposition 3.6, there is a cycle in G containing g 1 and g 2 , and an open ear decomposition with this cycle as the first ear.
We will construct a bipolar ordering of the vertices that begins with g 1 and ends with g 2 . Assume that the first ear is a cycle with vertex order g 1 , h 1 , . . . , h i , g 2 , h i+1 , . . . , h j . We arrange these vertices as
For each subsequent ear, suppose that the two vertices belonging to previous ears are h and h ′ , where h appears before h ′ in the current ordering. We insert the remaining vertices on the path from h to h ′ into the ordering directly after h, following the same order as in the path. One can check (for example, by induction on the number of ears) that the resulting ordering is a bipolar ordering beginning with g 1 and ending with g 2 .
Consider first the case where u(g 1 ) > 1/2 or u(g 2 ) > 1/2; assume without loss of generality that u(g 1 ) > 1/2. In this case, MMS(u, 2) = 1 − u(g 1 ) < 1/2, contradicting the assumption that MMS(u, 2) = 1/2. Assume now that max{u(g 1 ), u(g 2 )} ≤ 1/2, and recall that u(g) ≤ 1/4 for all g ∈ {g 1 , g 2 }. Since MMS(u, 2) = 1/2, it suffices to find a connected bipartition such that both parts have value at least 3/8. Let S = {g 1 }, so u(S) ≤ 1/2. We add one good at a time to S following the bipolar ordering until u(S) ≥ 1/2. Since u(g 2 ) ≤ 1/2, we stop (not necessarily directly) before we add g 2 . Moreover, since each good besides g 1 and g 2 has value at most 1/4, at some point during this process we must have 3/8 ≤ u(S) ≤ 5/8. In the bipartition with S as one part, both parts are connected and have value at least 3/8, completing the proof.
Unlike for Theorem 3.3, the proof of Theorem 3.7 does not directly lead to a polynomialtime algorithm for computing an allocation such that both agents receive 3/4 of their MMS. The problematic step is when we apply Lemma 3.5, since computing the MMS value is NP-hard by a straightforward reduction from the partition problem. Woeginger [1997] showed that a PTAS for the problem exists-using his PTAS, we can obtain a (3/4 − ǫ)-approximation algorithm that runs in polynomial time for any constant ǫ > 0. Nevertheless, we show in Appendix A that by building upon the proof of Theorem 3.7, we can also achieve a polynomial-time 3/4-approximation algorithm.
In light of Theorems 3.3 and 3.7, it is tempting to believe that for graphs with connectivity 3 or higher, the PoC is strictly greater than 3/4. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case: a counterexample is the wheel graph shown in Figure 1 , which has connectivity 3. In the instance shown in the figure, the MMS is 4 while the G-MMS is 3, so the PoC of the graph is at most 3/4 (and by Theorem 3.7, exactly 3/4). The key point of this example is that the graph cannot be partitioned into two connected subgraphs in such a way that one subgraph contains the vertices with value 1 and 3, while the other subgraph contains the two vertices with value 2. This observation allows us to generalize the counterexample. A graph is said to be 2-linked if for any two disjoint pairs of vertices (a, b) and (c, d), there exist two vertex-disjoint paths, one from a to b and the other from c to d. Proof. Suppose that G is not 2-linked, and let (a, b) and (c, d) be disjoint pairs of vertices such that there do not exist two disjoint paths, one from a to b and the other from c to d. Consider a valuation u such that u(a) = 1, u(b) = 3, and u(c) = u(d) = 2. We have MMS(u, 2) = 4. On the other hand, the graph cannot be partitioned into two connected subgraphs in such a way that one subgraph contains a and b while the other subgraph contains c and d-indeed, such a partition would give rise to two disjoint paths that cannot exist by our assumption. This means that G-MMS(u, 2) = 3. Hence PoC(G, 2) ≤ 3/4. All graphs with connectivity at most 2 are not 2-linked, 7 and Figure 1 shows an 7 Indeed, given such a graph, let a, b be two vertices whose removal disconnects the graph, and let c, d example of a 3-connected graph that also does not satisfy the property. In fact, Mészáros [2015] constructed a 5-connected graph that still fails to be 2-linked! 8 Combining these facts with Theorem 3.7 yields the following corollaries:
Corollary 3.9. Let G be a graph with connectivity 2. We have PoC(G, 2) = 3/4. Corollary 3.10. There exists a graph G with connectivity 5 such that PoC(G, 2) = 3/4. While we have not been able to establish a general bound on the PoC for graphs with connectivity 3 or above, we demonstrate next that 'almost-complete' graphs do have PoC higher than 3/4. In particular, we consider complete graphs with a nonempty matching removed. These graphs have minimum degree m − 2, where m is the number of vertices (i.e., goods). We show that the PoC of these graphs is always exactly (2m − 5)/(2m − 4), with the only exception being the graph L 5 that results from removing two disjoint edges from the complete graph K 5 (Figure 2 ). The graph L 5 is not 2-linked, so Proposition 3.8 (or alternatively, the valuation in Figure 2 ) implies that its PoC is at most 3/4 instead of 5/6. In fact, since the graph has connectivity 3, Theorem 3.7 tells us that its PoC is exactly 3/4. Theorem 3.11. Let G be a graph that results from removing a nonempty matching from a complete graph with at least three vertices, and assume that G is different from L 5 . Then PoC(G, 2) = (2m − 5)/(2m − 4).
To prove the theorem, we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12. Let k be a positive integer, 2 ≤ s ≤ 2k be a real number, and let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ≥ 1 be real numbers with sum s. For any real number 0 ≤ r ≤ s − 2, there exists a subset J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k} such that r ≤ j∈J x j ≤ r + 2.
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. For the base case k = 1 we must have s = 2, x 1 = 2, r = 0, and the result holds trivially. Suppose now that the result holds for k − 1; we will prove it for k. Assume without loss of generality that x 1 = max{x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k }.
be vertices from distinct components in the resulting graph. Then any path between c and d must go through either a or b. 8 On the other hand, a 6-connected graph is always 2-linked [Jung, 1970] .
First, assume that x 1 ≤ 2. Define y i := x 1 + x 2 + · · · + x i for each i. The sequence 0, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k = s is strictly increasing and any two consecutive terms differ by at most 2, so one of the terms x 1 + x 2 + · · · + x i must be between r and r + 2. Hence we may take J = {1, 2, . . . , i} to fulfill the claim.
Assume from now on that x 1 > 2. We first prove the statement for r ≥ s/2 − 1. If x 1 > s/2 + 1, then since x i ≥ 1 for all i, we have
Applying the induction hypothesis on x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x k , we find that there is a set L ⊆ {2, 3, . . . , k} such that r − x 1 ≤ l∈L x l ≤ r − x 1 + 2. Take J = L ∪ {1}. We have r ≤ j∈J x j ≤ r + 2, as desired.
Finally, suppose that r < s/2 − 1. We have
so we know from the previous case (r ≥ s/2 − 1) that there exists a subset J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k} for which s − r − 2 ≤ j∈J x j ≤ s − r. Since k j=1 x j = s, it follows that r ≤ j∈{1,2,...,k}\J x j ≤ r + 2, completing the proof.
We are now ready to establish Theorem 3.11.
Proof of Theorem 3.11. First, we show that the PoC of G is at most (2m − 5)/(2m − 4). Let (v 1 , v 2 ) be a missing edge. Consider a valuation with value m − 2 for each of v 1 and v 2 , value m − 1 for another vertex v 3 , and value 1 for each of the remaining m − 3 vertices (so the total value is 4m − 8). The MMS is 2m − 4, attained by the bipartition with {v 1 , v 2 } as one part. Take an arbitrary connected bipartition. If v 1 and v 2 are in the same part, this part must contain at least one other vertex, so the other part has value at most 2m − 5. On the other hand, if v 1 and v 2 are in different parts, the part that does not contain v 3 has value at most 2m − 5. In either case, there is a part with value no more than 2m − 5, so the G-MMS is at most 2m − 5. It follows that the PoC is at most (2m − 5)/(2m − 4).
Next, we show that the PoC of G is at least (2m − 5)/(2m − 4). Take an arbitrary valuation u, and assume without loss of generality that u(M ) = 4m − 8. By Lemma 3.5, we may also assume that MMS(u, 2) = (4m − 8)/2 = 2m − 4. It suffices to show that G-MMS(u, 2) ≥ 2m − 5. Consider any MMS partition. If the partition is connected, we have that the G-MMS is 2m − 4. Suppose therefore that the partition is not connected. Since G results from removing a nonempty matching from a complete graph, this means that (at least) one of the parts corresponds to a missing edge. Let v 1 and v 2 be the two vertices in that part (so u({v 1 , v 2 }) = 2m − 4), and v 3 , . . . , v m be the remaining vertices of G.
Assume first that there exists a vertex v ∈ {v 1 , v 2 } such that u(v) ≤ 1. We have 2m − 4 ≤ u({v 1 , v 2 , v}) ≤ 2m − 3, and the vertices v 1 , v 2 , v form a connected subgraph.
Moreover, since the graph G is different from L 5 , the remaining vertices also form a connected subgraph; together these vertices have value at least (4m − 8) − (2m − 3) = 2m − 5. Hence, in the connected bipartition with {v 1 , v 2 , v} as one part, both parts have value at least 2m − 5. It follows that G-MMS(u, 2) ≥ 2m − 5 in this case.
Assume now that every vertex v ∈ {v 1 , v 2 } satisfies u(v) > 1. If u(v 1 ) ≥ 2m − 5, then taking the connected bipartition with v 1 alone as one part again yields G-MMS(u, 2) ≥ 2m − 5; an analogous argument applies if u
. . , u(v m )}, and r = 2m − 5 − u(v 1 ), we find that there exists a subset of {u(v 3 ), . . . , u(v m )} for which the sum of the elements belongs to the interval
Letting S be the set of corresponding goods along with v 1 , we have 2m − 5 ≤ u(S) ≤ 2m − 3. Hence, in the connected bipartition with S as one part, both parts have value at least 2m − 5. Therefore G-MMS(u, 2) ≥ 2m − 5 in this case as well, and the proof is complete.
Any Number of Agents
We move on to the general setting where the goods are divided among an arbitrary number of agents. In this setting, it is no longer true that the PoC precisely captures the MMS approximation that can be guaranteed to the agents-this is evident in the case of a complete graph, where the MMS is 1 by definition, but an allocation that gives all agents their full MMS does not always exist [Kurokawa et al., 2018] . At first glance, it may seem conceivable that certain graphs do not admit any useful MMS approximation. However, we provide a non-trivial guarantee for arbitrary graphs that depends only on the number of agents and goods (Theorem 3.14). We begin by establishing a general lower bound on the PoC.
Theorem 3.13. For any graph G and any number of agents n, we have PoC(G, n) ≥ 1/(m − n + 1).
Proof. If m < n, the PoC is 1. Assume that m ≥ n, and consider an arbitrary valuation u. Let (M 1 , . . . , M n ) be a (not necessarily connected) partition of M that maximizes min i=1,...,n u(M i ). We assume without loss of generality that |M i | ≥ 1 for each i, which also means that |M i | ≤ m − n + 1 for every i.
For each i, let g i be a good of highest value in M i according to u, and let M ′ i = {g i }. As long as ∪ n i=1 M ′ i = M , we add a good not already in ∪ n i=1 M ′ i to one of the bundles M ′ i so that the bundle remains connected; this is always possible since G is connected. At the end of this process, (M ′ 1 , . . . , M ′ n ) is a connected partition of M . By our choice of g i , we have
Hence PoC(G, n) ≥ 1/(m − n + 1).
As we will see in Theorems 3.16 and 3.19, the bound 1/(m−n+1) is tight for sufficiently short paths and all stars. We now give a maximin share guarantee for arbitrary graphs.
Theorem 3.14. For any graph G and any number of agents n, there exists a connected allocation that gives each agent at least 1/(m − n + 1) of their MMS.
Proof. Take an arbitrary spanning tree H of G. By Theorem 3.13, PoC(H, n) ≥ 1/(m − n + 1). By Theorem 3.2, there exists a connected allocation with respect to H that gives each agent at least 1/(m − n + 1) times their MMS. Since any connected allocation with respect to H is also connected with respect to G, the conclusion follows.
Next, we derive tight bounds on the PoC in the cases of paths and stars for any number of agents. By Theorem 3.2, this is equivalent to finding the optimal MMS approximation for each of these cases. The following simple fact about MMS will be useful for our proofs. Proof. Observe that in any partition of the vertices into n parts, at least one of the parts is contained in M ′ . In particular, this holds for a MMS partition. It follows that MMS(u, n) ≤ u(M ′ ), as claimed.
Theorem 3.16. Let n ≥ 2 and let G be a star. Then
Proof. If m < n the PoC is 1, so assume that m ≥ n. We first show that the PoC is at most 1/(m − n + 1). Consider a valuation u with value m − n + 1 for the center vertex and for n − 2 of the leaves, and value 1 for each of the remaining m − n + 1 leaves. We have MMS(u, n) = m − n + 1. In any connected partition into n parts, at least n − 1 parts contain a single leaf. This means that at least one of these parts contains a single leaf with value 1. Hence the PoC is at most 1/(m − n + 1). Next, we show that the PoC is at least 1/(m − n + 1). Take an arbitrary valuation u, let v * be the center vertex, and let v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n−1 be the leaves with the highest value where u(v 1 ) ≥ · · · ≥ u(v n−1 ). Consider a connected partition Π with each of these n − 1 vertices as a part, and the remaining m − n + 1 vertices as the last part.
Let A := M \{v * , v 1 , . . . , v n−2 }. By Lemma 3.15, MMS(u, n) ≤ u(A). Since there are m − n + 1 vertices in A and v n−1 is a vertex with the highest value, we have
It follows that u(v i ) ≥ MMS(u, n)/(m − n + 1) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, so the first n − 1 parts of Π have value at least MMS(u, n)/(m − n + 1) each. The last part of Π is B := M \{v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n−1 }. By Lemma 3.15 again, we have MMS(u, n) ≤ u(B). This means that all parts of Π have value at least MMS(u, n)/(m − n + 1), as desired.
The proof of Theorem 3.16 also gives rise to a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a connected allocation for n agents on a star such that each agent receives at least 1/(m − n + 1) of their MMS: Let each of the first n − 1 agents pick a favorite leaf from the remaining leaves in turn, and let the last agent take the remaining m − n + 1 vertices.
We now address the case of paths. First, we introduce an approximation of proportionality that may be of independent interest. Recall that an allocation is said to be proportional if it gives every agent at least their proportional share, which is defined as u(M )/n. Even though a proportional allocation always exists for divisible goods, as we explained in the introduction, this is not the case for indivisible goods. Our definition adapts proportionality to the setting of indivisible goods. An allocation is said to satisfy the IPS property if every agent receives a bundle that satisfies the IPS property. For brevity, we will refer to a bundle or allocation that satisfies the IPS property as being IPS.
We remark that IPS is a stronger property than the property PROP * (n − 1) considered by Segal-Halevi and Suksompong [2018] , which corresponds to taking IPS(n, m) = 1/n for m ≥ n and 0 for m < n. It is also stronger than PROP1 considered by Conitzer et al. [2017] and Aziz et al. [2019] , as well as a proportionality relaxation studied by Suksompong [2019] . Despite its strength, we show that an IPS allocation always exists. Moreover, we can obtain a connected IPS allocation if the graph is a path.
Proposition 3.18. Let n ≥ 2 and let G be a path. There exists a connected IPS allocation of the m goods to the n agents.
Proof. If m < n, each agent needs utility 0 in an IPS allocation, so the claim holds trivially. Assume that m ≥ n. Starting with an empty bundle, we process the goods along the path (say, from left to right) and add them one at a time to the current bundle until the bundle is IPS to at least one of the agents. We then allocate the bundle to one such agent, and repeat the procedure with the remaining goods and agents. Any leftover goods are allocated to the agent who receives the last bundle.
We claim that this procedure always results in an IPS allocation. Notice from Definition 3.17 that if a bundle is IPS for an agent, then so is any superset of the bundle. Hence it suffices to show that after n − 1 bundles are allocated, the last agent still finds the remaining bundle to be IPS. Assume without loss of generality that the bundles are allocated to agents 1, 2, . . . , n in this order, and let u be the valuation of agent n. The claim holds trivially if the empty bundle is IPS for agent n, so assume that it is not. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, let the bundle allocated to agent i be M
In particular, |Y | ≤ n − 1. Let M n be the bundle allocated to agent n. We consider two cases.
• Case 1: m ≥ 2n − 1. By definition of the procedure, agent n does not find any of the bundles X 1 , . . . , X n−1 to be IPS. In particular, noting that Y ⊆ M \X i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and taking B = Y in Definition 3.17, we have u(X i ) < IPS(n, m) · u(M \Y ) = u(M \Y )/n for all i. Hence,
Since Y ⊆ M \M n , bundle M n is IPS for agent n.
• Case 2: n ≤ m ≤ 2n − 1. First, we show that at most m − n of the first n − 1 agents can receive at least two goods. Assume for contradiction that at least m − n + 1 of these agents receive at least two goods, and suppose that the first m − n + 1 of them are agents a 1 , . . . , a m−n+1 in this order. Let j be the first good in agent a m−n+1 's bundle. We claim that the bundle consisting of good j alone is IPS for agent n; this is sufficient for the desired contradiction because agent n should have taken this bundle ahead of agent a m−n+1 .
Before agent a m−n+1 receives her bundle, the goods in X allocated to earlier agents are precisely those in the set
By definition of the procedure, agent n does not find any of the bundles X a 1 , . . . , X a m−n to be IPS. In particular, noting that Z ⊆ M \X a i and taking B = Z in Definition 3.17, we have u(X a i ) < u(M \Z)/(m − n + 1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − n. Hence,
Since Z ⊆ M \{j}, bundle {j} is IPS for agent n, so agent n should indeed have taken this bundle ahead of agent a m−n+1 . This contradiction means that at most m − n of the first n − 1 agents can receive at least two goods.
We now proceed in a similar way as in Case 1. By definition of the procedure, agent n does not find any of the bundles X 1 , . . . , X n−1 to be IPS. In particular, noting that Y ⊆ M \X i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and taking B = Y in Definition 3.17, we have u(
where the inequality holds because at most m − n of the sets X i are nonempty.
The two cases together complete the proof.
Proposition 3.18 allows us to establish the PoC for paths, which we do next in Theorem 3.19. Conversely, the instances that we use to show the upper bound on the PoC in Theorem 3.19 also show that the factor IPS(n, m) in the existence guarantee of Proposition 3.18 cannot be improved.
Theorem 3.19. Let n ≥ 2 and let G be a path. Then
Proof. If m < n the PoC is 1, so assume that m ≥ n. We will show that PoC(G, n) = IPS(n, m). First, we show that PoC(G, n) ≥ IPS(n, m). Take an arbitrary valuation u. Applying Proposition 3.18 to n agents who have the same valuation u, we find that there exists a connected IPS allocation. This means each agent i receives a bundle M i for which there exists a set
for all agents i. Hence (M 1 , . . . , M n ) is a connected partition with each part having value at least IPS(n, m) · MMS(u, n). It follows that PoC(G, n) ≥ IPS(n, m).
Next, we show that PoC(G, n) ≤ IPS(n, m). We consider two cases.
• Case 1: m ≥ 2n − 1. Consider a valuation u with value 1, n, 1, . . . , n, 1 for the first 2n − 1 vertices on the path (so exactly n vertices have value 1), and value 0 for the remaining vertices. We have MMS(u, n) = n. On the other hand, one can check that in any connected partition into n parts, at least one of the parts has value at most 1. Hence the PoC is at most 1/n = IPS(n, m).
• Case 2: n ≤ m < 2n − 1. Consider a valuation u with value 1, m − n + 1, 1, . . . , m − n + 1, 1 for the first 2m − 2n + 1 vertices on the path (so m − n + 1 vertices have value 1 while m − n vertices have value m − n + 1), and value m − n + 1 for the remaining 2n − 1 − m vertices. In total, n − 1 vertices have value m − n + 1, and m − n + 1 vertices have value 1. We have MMS(u, n) = m − n + 1. On the other hand, one can check that in any connected partition into n parts, at least one of the parts has value at most 1. Hence the PoC is at most 1/(m−n+1) = IPS(n, m).
In both cases we have PoC(G, n) ≤ IPS(n, m), completing the proof.
In order to compute a connected allocation for n agents on a path such that every agent receives at least PoC(G, n) of their MMS, we can use the algorithm in Proposition 3.18, which runs in polynomial time, to compute a connected IPS allocation. The first part in the proof of Theorem 3.19 implies that this allocation fulfills the desired guarantee.
Relaxations of Envy-Freeness
In this section, we consider relaxations of envy-freeness. Unless specified otherwise, we allow agents to have arbitrary monotonic valuations. We say that a graph G guarantees EFk for n agents if for all permitted valuations of the n agents, there exists a connected EFk allocation.
Two Agents
For two agents, Bilò et al. [2019] characterized the set of graphs that always admit an EF1 allocation regardless of the agents' valuations. Their characterization is based on the observation that such graphs necessarily admit a vertex ordering to which a discrete variant of the cut-and-choose protocol can be applied-in other words, the ordering is bipolar. The family of graphs that admit a bipolar ordering can be characterized using the block decomposition of a graph. A block is a maximal biconnected subgraph of a graph, and a cut vertex is a vertex whose removal increases the number of connected components in the graph. The block decomposition of a graph G is a bipartite graph B(G) with all blocks of G on one side and all cut vertices of G on the other side; there is an edge between a block and a cut vertex in B(G) if and only if the cut vertex belongs to the block in G. 9
Proposition 4.1 (Bondy and Murty [2008] ). For any connected graph G, each pair of blocks share no edge and at most one cut vertex, and the block decomposition B(G) is a tree. Bilò et al. [2019] showed that a connected graph G guarantees EF1 for two agents if and only if a bipolar ordering exists in G, i.e., the blocks of G can be arranged into a path.
Proposition 4.2 (Bilò et al. [2019] ). For any connected graph G, the following four conditions are equivalent: 10
(1) The block decomposition B(G) is a path;
(2) G admits a bipolar ordering;
(3) G guarantees EF1 for two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations;
(4) G guarantees EF1 for two agents with identical binary valuations. Bilò et al. [2019] 's characterization allows us to identify graphs for which an EF1 allocation always exists in the case of two agents. However, for the remaining graphs, it does not provide any fairness guarantee. Our next result generalizes their characterization by giving the best possible EFk guarantee that can be made for each specific graph. In particular, we will show that a graph G guarantees EFk for two agents if and only if G admits a bipolar ordering over a subset of the vertices where each vertex in the ordering has at most k − 1 vertices 'hanging' from it.
To formalize this idea, it will be useful to define the following notions. Given a path P in the block graph B(G) of a graph G, for any vertex v of G that is not contained in any block in P , we define its guardian to be the cut vertex v ′ closest to v in B(G) that belongs to some block in P (see Figure 3 for an example); we say that v is a dependent of v ′ . For a given graph, we define a merge on a subset V of vertices forming a connected subgraph to be an operation where we replace the vertices in V by a single vertex v, and there is an edge between v and another vertex w in the new graph exactly when w is adjacent to at least one vertex of V in the original graph. A path in a tree is said to be maximal if each of its end vertices is a leaf of the tree. (1) There exists a path P in the block decomposition B(G) such that each cut vertex that belongs to some block in P has at most k − 1 dependents;
(2) The vertices of G can be partitioned into disjoint subsets V 1 , . . . , V r such that each V j forms a connected subgraph of size at most k in G, and if we merge the vertices in every set V j separately, the resulting graph admits a bipolar ordering;
(3) G guarantees EFk for two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations;
(4) G guarantees EFk for two agents with identical binary valuations.
Proof. Consider the block decomposition B(G), and recall from Proposition 4.1 that B(G) is a tree. For each path P of B(G), we denote by C(P ) the set of cut vertices that belong to some block in P .
To show (1) ⇒ (2), suppose that there exists a path P in the block decomposition B(G) such that each cut vertex in C(P ) has at most k − 1 dependents. Take each set V j in the theorem statement to consist of a vertex in C(P ) along with all of its dependents. Clearly, at most k vertices belong to each V j . Also, each V j is connected since the vertices in V j form a connected subgraph of the block decomposition. Let G ′ be the graph resulting from the merge operations on each V j separately. The block decomposition of G ′ is a path, and hence G ′ admits a bipolar ordering by Proposition 4.2.
To show (2) ⇒ (3), suppose that the vertices of G can be partitioned into disjoint subsets V 1 , . . . , V r as defined in the statement of the theorem. We will show that G guarantees EFk for two agents. Consider arbitrary monotonic valuations of the two agents u i for i = 1, 2. Let G ′ be the graph resulting from the merge operations on each V j for j = 1, . . . , r. We define the valuations u ′ i on G ′ for i = 1, 2, where the value of an agent for each bundle M ′ is equal to her value for all vertices of G that are merged into the vertices of M ′ . Specifically, for each i = 1, 2 and each bundle M ′ in G ′ ,
Note that each u ′ i remains monotonic and, by our assumption, G ′ admits a bipolar ordering. Thus, by Proposition 4.2, G ′ admits a connected EF1 allocation (M ′ 1 , M ′ 2 ) with the valuations u ′ i , so an agent's envy can be eliminated by removing a vertex of G ′ from the other agent's bundle. Consider the corresponding allocation (
Since each vertex of G ′ is a merge of at most k vertices, any envy that results from this allocation can be eliminated by removing at most k vertices, and so the allocation (M 1 , M 2 ) is a connected EFk allocation of G.
The implication (3) ⇒ (4) is immediate. To show (4) ⇒ (1), suppose that for every path P of B(G), there exists some cut vertex in C(P ) with at least k dependents. We will show that there exist identical binary valuations for which the graph G does not admit an EFk allocation.
Let k * ≥ 1 be the smallest number for which there exists a maximal path P in B(G) such that each cut vertex in C(P ) is the guardian of at most k * − 1 vertices in G. Choose a maximal path P in B(G) where each cut vertex in C(P ) has at most k * −1 dependents; if several such paths exist, choose one that minimizes the number of vertices in C(P ) with exactly k * − 1 dependents. By definition of k * , we have k * − 1 ≥ k. Hence it suffices to show the existence of identical binary valuations for which the graph G does not admit an EF(k * − 1) allocation.
Let v ∈ C(P ) be a cut vertex with k * − 1 dependents. It could be that v is on the path P itself (e.g., vertices v 1 , v 6 , and v 7 in Figure 3 ), or v is not on the path P but belongs to some block in P (e.g., vertex v 3 in Figure 3 ). We consider the two cases separately.
• Case 1: v is in the path P itself. Let L v and R v be the subtree of the tree B(G) rooted at v starting with each of the two blocks adjacent to v on the path P , respectively. For each subtree besides L v and R v of the tree B(G) rooted at v, with a block adjacent to v in B(G) as the root of the subtree, define its size to be the number of dependents of v in G belonging to at least one block in the subtree. Note that the size can be different from the number of vertices in the subtree in B(G).
Suppose that T is a largest subtree among such subtrees and has size r ≤ k * − 1.
We claim that at least r vertices of G (excluding v) belong to some block in L v . Assume for contradiction that there are at most r − 1 such vertices. In B(G), we switch L v with T and choose an arbitrary path of T that contains a leaf of B(G) to be on the main path P (see Figure 4 ). Let P ′ denote the new maximal path.
Since v loses at least r dependents and gains at most r − 1 new dependents, v now has at most k * − 2 dependents with respect to P ′ . Moreover, since T has size at most k * − 1, each of the new cut vertices in C(P ′ ) has at most k * − 2 dependents. Hence we have decreased the number of cut vertices with k * − 1 dependents by at least 1. This gives the desired contradiction. The same argument shows that at least r vertices of G (excluding v) belong to some block in R v .
Consider two agents who have the same binary valuation with value 1 for v, its k * − 1 dependents, r arbitrary vertices of G (besides v) belonging to some block in L v , and r arbitrary vertices of G (besides v) belonging to some block in R v , and value 0 for the remaining vertices. The total value of an agent is 2r + k * . In any connected allocation, one of the agents does not receive v. This agent receives value at most r, while the remaining goods are worth at least r + k * . It follows that the allocation cannot be EF(k * − 1).
• Case 2: v is not in the path P but belongs to some block B in P . Let L B and R B be the subtree of the tree B(G) rooted at B starting with each of the two cut vertices adjacent to B on the path P , respectively. We claim that at least k * vertices of G belong to some block in L B . Assume for contradiction that there are at most k * − 1 such vertices. Let v ′ be the cut vertex in L B adjacent to B. In B(G), we switch L B with v and its dependents, and choose an arbitrary path P ′ that starts with v and contains at least one of its dependents as well as a leaf of B(G) to be on the main path P (see Figure 5 ). Let P ′′ denote the new maximal path. Since L B contains at most k * − 1 vertices (which include v ′ ), v ′ now has at most k * − 2 dependents with respect to P ′′ . Moreover, the subtree that replaced L B has at most k * vertices. Among these vertices, v and at least one other vertex belong to P ′ , which is now on the new path P ′′ , so any new cut vertex has at most k * − 2 dependents. Hence we have decreased the number of cut vertices with k * − 1 dependents by at least 1. This gives the desired contradiction. The same argument shows that at least k * vertices of G belong to some block in R B .
Consider two agents who have the same binary valuation with value 1 for v, its k * − 1 dependents, k * arbitrary vertices of G belonging to some block in L B , and k * arbitrary vertices of G belonging to some block in R B , and value 0 for the remaining vertices. The total value of an agent is 3k * . In any connected allocation, one of the agents receives a bundle whose vertices of value 1 are contained in L B , R B , or the set with v and its dependents. This agent receives value at most k * , while the remaining goods are worth at least 2k * . It follows that the allocation cannot be EF(k * − 1).
Hence, in both cases there exist identical binary valuations for which the graph does not admit an EF(k * − 1) allocation, as claimed.
Theorem 4.3 allows us to determine in polynomial time the optimal k such that a given graph always admits an EFk allocation, as well as to compute such an allocation. To do so, we compute the block decomposition B(G) of the graph-this can be done in linear time [Hopcroft and Tarjan, 1973] . We then determine the value of k * in the proof of the theorem, which we have shown to be equal to the optimal value of k; this can be done by testing all pairs of vertices as endpoints of the path P . Finally, we compute a bipolar ordering of the vertices belonging to P -again, this takes linear time [Even and Tarjan, 1976 ]-and apply the EF1 algorithm of Bilò et al. [2019] on the merged vertices.
Theorem 4.3 also yields a short proof that every graph admits an EF(m−2) allocation. Moreover, we show that the bound m − 2 is tight for stars.
Proposition 4.4. Let n = 2, and let G be any graph with at least three vertices. There exists a connected EF(m − 2) allocation to the two agents.
Proof. Since the graph contains at least three vertices, it has a path of length 2; let the three vertices on this path be v
We add the remaining vertices to these sets arbitrarily so that each set remains connected. Clearly, each set contains at most m − 2 vertices. Theorem 4.3 then implies that an EF(m − 2) allocation exists.
Proposition 4.5. Let n = 2, and let G be a star with at least two edges. There exist identical binary valuations of the two agents such that a connected EF(m − 3) allocation does not exist.
Proof. Consider two agents who have value 1 for every good. In any connected allocation, one of the agents receives at most one good, while the other agent receives at least m − 1 goods. Hence the allocation cannot be EF(m − 3).
Next, we consider a stronger fairness notion, EFX. It is known that for two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, an EFX allocation always exists [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018] . We show that if we consider connected allocations, the statement remains true only if the graph is complete.
Theorem 4.6. Let n = 2, and let G be a non-complete graph. There exist identical additive valuations of the two agents such that no connected allocation is EFX.
Proof. Pick an arbitrary missing edge of G, and let ǫ > 0 be a sufficiently small constant. Suppose that the two agents have value 2 for each of the two vertices with a missing edge (call them v 1 and v 2 ), and value 3, ǫ, ǫ, . . . , ǫ for the remaining vertices (call the first vertex v 3 ). Assume for contradiction that there exists a connected EFX allocation. In this allocation, neither of the agents can receive v 3 together with one (or both) of v 1 , v 2 . So one of the agents must receive v 1 and v 2 , while the other agent receives v 3 . If the first agent also receives one of the remaining vertices, the allocation cannot be EFX. So the second agent receives all of the remaining vertices. However, the resulting allocation is not connected, a contradiction.
Three Agents
We now move on to the case of three agents. Bilò et al. [2019] showed that in this case, an EF1 allocation is guaranteed to exist if the graph contains a Hamiltonian path 11 or if it is a star with three edges. We extend this result by characterizing all trees and complete bipartite graphs that always admit an EF1 allocation.
Theorem 4.7. Let n = 3, and let G be a tree. Then G admits a connected EF1 allocation for three agents with arbitrary valuations if and only if G is either a path, or a star with three edges.
Proof. The 'if' direction was already shown by Bilò et al. [2019] ; we establish the 'only if' direction. Assume that G is neither a path, nor a star with three edges. Suppose first that there is a vertex v with degree at least 4. Consider three agents who have identical valuations with value 1 on v and four of its neighbors, and 0 on all other vertices. In any connected allocation, an agent who does not get v receives value at most 1, while the bundle of the agent who gets v has value at least 3 to her. Hence the allocation is not EF1.
Suppose now that every vertex has degree at most 3. Since G is not a path, there is a vertex v with degree 3. Moreover, since G is not a star, one of the branches from v contains at least two vertices, say a branch starting with a neighbor v 1 of v followed by another vertex v 2 . Let v 3 , v 4 be the two other vertices adjacent to v. Consider three agents who have identical valuations with value 2 for v, v 3 , v 4 , value 3 for v 1 , value 4 for v 2 , and value 0 for all other vertices (see Figure 6 ). Consider any connected allocation; in what follows, we will only be concerned with goods of non-zero value. First, assume that one of the agents receives either only v 3 or only v 4 , and obtains value at most 2. If another agent receives at least three goods, the allocation is clearly not EF1. So each of the other two agents receives exactly two goods, which means one of them receives v 1 and v 2 . This bundle is worth 3 to the first agent even after removing the most valuable good, so the allocation cannot be EF1. Hence one of the agents receives v 3 , v 4 , and v. But then the agent who does not receive v 2 will envy this agent even after removing one good. Next, we consider complete bipartite graphs. Denote by K a,b the complete bipartite graph with a vertices on the left (call this set of vertices L) and b vertices on the right (call this set of vertices R). We start by showing that if a, b ≥ 3, there always exists a connected allocation. In fact, we state and prove a generalization that holds for any number of agents.
Proposition 4.8. Let n ≥ 2, and let G be a complete bipartite graph K a,b with a, b ≥ n. Then G always admits a connected EF1 allocation.
Proof. We enhance the envy cycle elimination algorithm of Lipton et al. [2004] , which computes an EF1 allocation for any number of agents. The algorithm works by allocating one good at a time in arbitrary order-we will exploit this freedom in choosing the order. It also maintains an envy graph, which has the agents as its vertices, and a directed edge i → j if agent i envies agent j with respect to the current (partial) allocation. At each step, the next good is allocated to an agent with no incoming edge, and any cycle that arises as a result is eliminated by giving j's bundle to i for each edge i → j in the cycle. This allows the algorithm to maintain the invariant that the envy graph is cycle-free, and so there exists an agent with no incoming edge before each allocation of a good.
We apply the envy cycle elimination algorithm by choosing a careful order of the goods to allocate. Since a ≥ n and every agent is unenvied at the beginning, we can first pick n goods from L and allocate one of them to each agent. After this point, we may no longer have control over which agent to choose next. Take an agent with no incoming edge in the envy graph. If the agent has already received a good from R, allocate to her a good from L if one still remains, otherwise allocate a good from R. Else, the agent has not received a good from R. In this case, allocate to her a good from R if one still remains, otherwise allocate a good from L. The pseudocode is presented as Algorithm 1. Move an arbitrary good from L to M i .
Algorithm 1 Enhanced Envy Cycle Elimination Algorithm

6:
while L ∪ R = ∅ do 7:
Update the envy graph. Move an arbitrary good from L to M i .
20:
return (M 1 , . . . , M n )
The resulting allocation is EF1 [Lipton et al., 2004] ; we now show that it is connected.
Every agent receives a good from L in the first phase of the algorithm. Note that if an agent receives at least one good from both L and R, her bundle is guaranteed to be connected. So it suffices to show that an agent will never receive more than one good from L without receiving a good from R. By construction, an agent who already has a good from R will take goods from L unless L is already empty. Since b ≥ n, this means that as long as some agent has not received a good from R and the algorithm has not terminated, there is at least one good from R left. This establishes the desired claim.
Since the envy cycle elimination algorithm runs in time polynomial in the number of agents and goods [Lipton et al., 2004] , the proof of Theorem 4.9 also yields a polynomialtime algorithm that computes a connected EF1 allocation for any number of agents. If the agents have additive valuations, we can also obtain an EF1 allocation via a "double round-robin algorithm"-the details can be found in Appendix B.
With Proposition 4.8 in hand, we can now proceed with the characterization for complete bipartite graphs. Proof. The case a = 1 is covered by Theorem 4.7 and the case a ≥ 3 by Proposition 4.8, so assume that a = 2. If b ≤ 3, then G contains a Hamiltonian path, so the existence of an EF1 allocation follows from the result of Bilò et al. [2019] . Else, let b ≥ 4. Consider three agents who have identical valuations with value 2 on each of the two vertices v 1 , v 2 ∈ L, value 1 on four of the vertices v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 ∈ R, and value 0 for the remaining vertices. Consider any connected allocation. If v 1 and v 2 are allocated to the same agent, this agent must also receive at least one of the vertices from R, and the allocation is not EF1. Else, one agent receives v 1 and another agent receives v 2 . Now, the third agent can get at most one vertex from R and therefore receives value at most 1. This means that one of the first two agents receives one of v 1 and v 2 along with at least two of v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 . This agent is envied by the third agent even after we remove a good. It follows that the allocation cannot be EF1.
Discussion
In this paper, we study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under connectivity constraints, and present an extensive set of results on the guarantees that can be achieved using maximin share fairness and relaxations of envy-freeness for various classes of graphs. For maximin share fairness, we establish a link between the graph-specific maximin share and the well-studied maximin share through our price of connectivity notion. We provide a number of bounds on the price of connectivity, several of which are tight. On the envy-freeness front, we classify all connected graphs based on the strongest relaxation with guaranteed existence in the case of two agents, and characterize the set of trees and complete bipartite graphs that always admit an EF1 allocation for three agents. Extending our results beyond three agents is a challenging problem: even when the graph is a path, the only known proof of EF1 existence for four agents employs arguments based on Sperner's lemma, and the corresponding question remains open when there are at least five agents [Bilò et al., 2019] .
Our results on envy-freeness relaxations hold for agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations. On the other hand, as is the case in most of the literature, our results on maximin share fairness rely on the assumption that the agents' valuations are additive. Maximin share fairness beyond additive valuations has been studied by Barman and Krishna Murthy [2017] and Ghodsi et al. [2018] ; for example, they showed that a constant approximation of the maximin share can be achieved for any number of agents with submodular valuations when the graph is complete. Since complementarity and substitutability are common in practice, it would be interesting to see how the graph-based approximations that we obtain in this paper change as we enlarge the class of valuations considered. Indeed, as Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] noted, there is a rich landscape of problems to explore in fair division with different classes of valuations, and our graph setting is likely to be no exception.
Finally, while our results in this work provide fairness guarantees that hold regardless of valuations of the agents, better guarantees can be obtained in many instances if we take the valuations into account. For example, even though an envy-free allocation does not always exist, it is known that such an allocation exists most of the time when valuations are drawn at random [Dickerson et al., 2014; Manurangsi and Suksompong, 2019] . On a complete graph, deciding the existence of an envy-free allocation is NP-hard even for two agents with identical valuations [Lipton et al., 2004] . By contrast, this problem can be solved efficiently on a tree or a cycle for any constant number of agents, since we can simply go through all of the (polynomially many) connected allocations; yet, the problem again becomes NP-hard even on a path if the number of agents is non-constant [Bouveret et al., 2017] . Similar computational questions can be asked for other combinations of graphs and fairness notions without guaranteed existence, and we believe that these questions constitute an important direction that deserves to be pursued in future work.
A. Algorithm for Theorem 3.7
In this section, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an allocation that gives both agents at least 3/4 of their MMS when the graph is biconnected. As in Theorem 3.3, it suffices to compute a bipartition such that the first agent has value at least 3/4 of her MMS for both parts; the second agent can then choose the part that she prefers.
To compute such a bipartition, we iterate over all pairs of goods g 1 , g 2 . For each pair, we construct a bipolar ordering that begins with g 1 and ends with g 2 ; this is possible as explained in the proof of Theorem 3.7. We then consider taking every possible prefix of the ordering as one part of the bipartition, and return the bipartition with the highest minimum between the two parts across all pairs g 1 , g 2 . The pseudocode of the algorithm is given as Algorithm 2.
that there exists a connected bipartition for which both parts have value at least 3/8, and this bipartition corresponds to one of the bipartitions examined by Algorithm 2.
Since the values in the original instance with valuation u can only be higher than in the new instance with valuation u ′ , in the original instance both parts of this bipartition also have value at least 3/8. It follows that both parts of the bipartition returned by Algorithm 2 have value at least 3/8, which is 3/4 of the MMS.
B. Double Round-Robin Algorithm
In this section, we provide a simple polynomial-time algorithm for computing a connected EF1 allocation among n agents with additive valuations, when the graph is a complete bipartite graph K a,b with a, b ≥ n. Let L and R denote the set of vertices on the left and right side of the graph, respectively. The algorithm proceeds by running the classical round-robin algorithm twice, once on L and once on R, with opposite orderings of the agents. The pseudocode is shown as Algorithm 3. Since a, b ≥ n, every agent receives at least one good from each of L and R, so the resulting allocation is connected. We claim that it is EF1. To see this, consider two agents i, i ′ with i < i ′ . When allocating each of the sets L and R, we consider a round to begin when i picks a good, and end just before the next time i picks a good (or when the set runs out of goods). During the allocation of L, in each round i picks before i ′ . Since the valuations are additive, i does not envy i ′ with respect to the goods in L. Similarly, i does not envy i ′ in each round during the allocation of R. The only possible source of envy is before the first round starts, when i ′ picks her first good. However, this means that the envy can be eliminated if we remove this good from the bundle of i ′ . Hence i does not envy i ′ up to one good in total; an analogous argument shows that i ′ also does not envy i up to one good. Since i and i ′ are arbitrary, the allocation is EF1.
Algorithm 3 Double Round-Robin Algorithm
